docs/diploma
view thesis/tex/4-MasqmailsFuture.tex @ 172:5c873e6478ef
wrote about encryption
| author | meillo@marmaro.de |
|---|---|
| date | Mon, 22 Dec 2008 20:42:33 +0100 |
| parents | 204683bfb4e7 |
| children | c51f1be54224 |
line source
1 \chapter{\masqmail's present and future}
3 \section{Existing code base}
4 Here regarded is version 0.2.21 of \masqmail. This is the last version released by Oliver \person{Kurth}, and the basis for my thesis.
7 \subsubsection*{Features}
9 \masqmail\ accepts mail on the command line and via \SMTP. Mail queueing and alias expansion is supported. \masqmail\ is able to deliver mail to local mailboxes (in \name{mbox} or \name{maildir} format) or pass it to a \name{mail delivery agent} (like \name{procmail}). Mail destinated to remote locations is sent using \SMTP\ or can be piped to commands, being gatesways to \NAME{UUCP} or \NAME{FAX} for example.
11 Outgoing \SMTP\ connections feature \SMTP-\NAME{AUTH} and \SMTP-after-\NAME{POP} authentication, but incoming connections do not. Using wrappers for outgoing connections is supported. This offers a two way communication through a wrapper application like \name{openssl}.
12 %todo: what about SSL/TLS encryption?
14 \masqmail\ focuses on non-permanent online connections, thus a concept of online routes is used. One may configure any amount of routes to send mail. Each route can have criterias, like matching \texttt{From:} or \texttt{To:} headers, to determine if mail is allowed to be sent using it. Mail to destinations outside the local net gets queued until \masqmail\ is informed about the existance of a online connection.
16 The \masqmail\ executable can be called under various names for sendmail-compatibility reasons. This is organized by symbolic links with different names pointing to the \masqmail\ executable. The \sendmail\ names are \path{/usr/lib/sendmail} and \path{/usr/sbin/sendmail} because many programs expect the \mta\ to be located there. Further more \sendmail\ supports calling it with a different name instead of supplying command line arguments. The best known of this shortcuts is \path{mailq}, which is equivilent to calling it with the argument \verb+-bq+. \masqmail\ recognizes the names \path{mailq}, \path{smtpd}, \path{mailrm}, \path{runq}, \path{rmail}, and \path{in.smtpd}. The first two are inspired by \sendmail. Not implemented is the name \path{newaliases} because \masqmail\ does not generate binary representations of the alias file.\footnote{A shell script located named \path{newaliases}, that invokes \texttt{masqmail -bi}, can provide the command to satisfy other software needing it.} \path{hoststat} and \path{purgestat} are missing for sendmail-compatibility.
17 %masqmail: mailq, mailrm, runq, rmail, smtpd/in.smtpd
18 %sendmail: hoststat, mailq, newaliases, purgestat, smtpd
20 Additional to the \mta\ job, \masqmail\ also offers mail retrieval services with being a \NAME{POP3} client. It can fetch mail from different remote locations, dependent on the active online route.
24 \subsubsection*{The code}
26 \masqmail\ is written in the C programming language. The program, as of version 0.2.21, consists of 34 source code and eight header files, containing about 9,000 lines of code\footnote{Measured with \name{sloccount} by David A.\ Wheeler.}. Additionally, it includes a \name{base64} implementation (about 300 lines) and \name{md5} code (about 150 lines). For systems that do not provide \name{libident}, this library is distributed as well (circa 600 lines); an available shared library however has higher precedence in linking.
28 The only mandatory dependency is \name{glib}---a cross-platform software utility library, originated in the \NAME{GTK+} project. It provides safer replacements for many standard library functions. It also offers handy data containers, easy-to-use implementations of data structures, and much more.
31 With \masqmail\ comes the small tool \path{mservdetect}; it helps setting up a configuration that uses the \name{mserver} system to detect the online state. Two other binaries get compiled for testing purposes: \path{readtest} and \path{smtpsend}. All three programms use \masqmail\ source code; they only add a file with a \verb+main()+ function each.
34 \masqmail\ does not provide an interface to plug in modules with additional functionality. There exists no add-on or module system. The code is only separated by function to the various source files. Some functional parts can be included or excluded by defining symbols. Adding maildir support at compile time, means giving the option \verb+--enable-maildir+ to the \path{configure} call. This preserves the concerning code to get removed by the preprocessor. Unfortunately the \verb+#ifdef+s are scattered through all the source, leading to a FIXME(holperig) code base.
40 \section{\masqmail\ next generation}
42 \subsection{Requirements}
44 Following is a list of current and future requirements to make \masqmail\ ready for the future.
47 \subsubsection*{Large message handling}
48 Trends in the market for electronic communication go towards consolidated communication, hence email will be used more to transfer voice and video messages. This leads to larger messages. The store-and-forward transport of email is not good suited for large data. Thus new protocols, like \NAME{QMTP} (described in section %\ref{FIXME}
49 ), may become popular.
52 \subsubsection*{Ressource friendly software}
53 The merge of communication hardware and the move of email services from providers to homes, demands smaller and more resource-friendly software. The amount of mail will be lower, even if much more mail will be sent. More important will be the energy consumption and heat emission. These topics increased in relevance during the past years and they are expected to become more central. \masqmail\ is not a program to be used on large servers, but to be used on small devices. Thus focusing on energy and heat, not on performance, is the direction to go.
56 \subsubsection*{New mail transfer protocols}
57 Large messages demand more efficient transport through the net. As well is a final solution needed to defeat the spam problem. New mail transport protocols may be the only good solutions for both problems. They also can improve reliability, authentication, and verification issues. \masqmail\ should be able to support new protocols as they appear and are used.
60 \subsubsection*{Spam handling}
61 Spam is a major threat. According to the \NAME{SWOT} analysis, the goal is to reduce it to a bearable level. Spam fighting is a war are where the good guys tend to lose. Putting too much effort there will result in few gain. Real success will only be possible with new---better---protocols and abandonning the weak legacy technologies. Hence \masqmail\ should be able to provide state-of-the-art spam protection, but not more.
64 \subsubsection*{Security}
65 \MTA{}s are critical points for computer security, as they are accessable from external networks. They must be secured with high effort. Properties like high priviledge level, work load influenced from extern, work on unsafe data, and demand for reliability, increase the security needed. Unsecure and unreliable \mta{}s are of no value. \masqmail\ needs to b e secure enough for its target field of operation.
68 \subsubsection*{Easy configuration}
69 Having \mta{}s on many home servers and clients, requires easy and standardized configuration. The common setups should be configurable with single actions by the user. Complex configuration should be possible, but focused must be the most common form of configuration: choosing one of several standard setups.
76 \subsection{Discussion on architecture}
78 A program's architecture is probably the most influencing design decision, and has the greatest impact on the program's future capabilities. %fixme: search quote ... check if good
80 \masqmail's current artitecture is monolitic like \sendmail's and \exim's. But more than the other two, is it one block of interweaved code. \sendmail\ provides now, with its \name{milter} interface, standardized connection channels to external modules. \exim\ has a highly structured code with many internal interfaces, like the one for supported authentication ``modules''. \masqmail\ has none of them; it is what \sendmail\ was in the beginning: a single large block.
82 Figure \ref{fig:masqmail-arch} is an attempt to depict \masqmail's internal structure.
84 \begin{figure}
85 \begin{center}
86 \input{input/masqmail-arch.tex}
87 \end{center}
88 \caption{Internal architecture of \masqmail}
89 \label{fig:masqmail-arch}
90 \end{figure}
92 \sendmail\ improved its old architecture, for example by adding the milter interface. \exim\ was designed and is carefully maintained with a modular-like code structure in mind. \qmail\ started from scratch with a ``security-first'' approach, \postfix\ improved on it, and \name{sendmail X}/\name{MeTA1} tries to adopt the best of \qmail\ and \postfix, to completely replace the old \sendmail\ architecture. \person{Hafiz} \cite{hafiz05}. describes this evolution of \mta\ architecture very well.
94 Every one of the popular \MTA{}s is more modular, or became more modular over time, than \masqmail\ is. Modern requirements like spam protection and future requirements like the use of new mail transport protocols demand modular designs for keeping the software simple. Simplicity is a key property for security.
96 \person{Hafiz} agrees:
97 \begin{quote}
98 The goal of making software secure can be better achieved by making the design simple and easier to understand and verify. \cite[page64]{hafiz05}
99 \end{quote}
100 He identifies the security of \qmail\ to come from it's \name{compartmentalization}, which goes hand in hand with modularity:
101 \begin{quote}
102 A perfect example is the contrast between the feature envy early \sendmail\ architecture implemented as one process and the simple, modular architecture of \qmail. The security of \qmail\ comes from its compartmentalized simple processes that perform one task only and are therefor testable for security. \cite[page 64]{hafiz05}
103 \end{quote}
104 As well does \person{Dent}: ``The modular architecture of Postfix forms the basis for much of its security.''\cite[page 7]{dent04}
106 Modularity is needed for supporting modern \MTA\ requirements, providing a clear interface to add further functionality without increasing the overall complexity much. Modularity is also an enabler for security. Security comes from good design, as \person{Graff} and \person{van Wyk} explain:
107 \begin{quote}
108 Good design is the sword and shield of the security-conscious developer. Sound design defends your application from subversion or misuse, protecting your network and the information on it from internal and external attacks alike. It also provides a safe foundation for future extensions and maintainance of the software.
109 %
110 %Bad design makes life easier for attackers and harder for the good guys, especially if it contributes to a false sends of security while obscuring pertinent failings.
111 \cite[page 55]{graff03}
112 \end{quote}
114 \person{Hafiz} adds: ``The major idea is that security cannot be retrofitted into an architecture.''\cite[page 64]{hafiz05}
116 All this leads to one logical step: The rewrite of \masqmail\ using a modern, modular architecture, to get a modern \MTA\ satisfying nowadays needs.
121 \subsection{Jobs of an MTA}
123 This section tries to identify the needed modules for a modern \MTA. They are later the pieces of which the new architecture is built of.
125 The basic job of a \mta\ is to tranport mail from a sender to a recipient. This is the definition of such a program and this is how \person{Dent}\cite[page 19]{dent04} and \person{Hafiz} \cite[pages 3-5]{hafiz05} generally see its design.
127 An \MTA\ therefor needs at least a mail receiving facility and a mail sending facility. Additionally probably all \MTA\ developers (excluded the only forwarders), see the need for a mail queue. A mail queue removes the need to deliver at once a message is received. They also provide fail-safe storage of mails until they are delivered.
131 \subsubsection*{Incoming channels}
133 \sendmail-compatible \mta{}s must support at least two incoming channels: mail submitted using the \sendmail\ command, and mail received via the \SMTP\ daemon. It is therefor common to split the incoming channel into local and remote. This is done by \qmail\ and \postfix. The same way is \person{Hafiz}'s view.
135 In contrast is \name{sendmail X}: Its locally submitted messages go to the \SMTP\ daemon, which is the only connection towards the mail queue. %fixme: is it a smtp dialog? or a second door?
136 \person{fanf} proposes a similar approach. He wants the \texttt{sendmail} command to be a simple \SMTP\ client that contacts the \SMTP\ daemon of the \MTA\ like it is done by connections from remote. The advantage here is one single module where all \SMTP\ dialog with submitters is done. Hence one single point to accept or refuse incoming mail. Additionally does the module to put mail into the queue not need to be \name{setuid} or \name{setgid} because it is only invoked from the \SMTP\ daemon. The \MTA's architecture would become simpler and common tasks are not duplicated in modules that do similar jobs.
138 But merging the input channels in the \SMTP\ daemon makes the \MTA\ heavily dependent on \SMTP\ being the main mail transfer protocol. To \qmail\ and \postfix\ new modules to support other ways of message receival may be added without change of other parts of the system. Also is it better to have more independent modules if each one is simpler then.
140 With the increasing need for new protocols in mind, it seems better to have single modules for each incoming channel, although this leads to duplicated acceptance checks.
143 \subsubsection*{Outgoing channels}
145 Outgoing mail is commonly either sent using \SMTP, piped into local commands (for example \texttt{uucp}), or delivered locally by appending to a mailbox.
147 Outgoing channels are similar for \qmail, \postfix, and \name{sendmail X}: All of them have a module to send mail using \SMTP, and one for writing into a local mailbox. Local mail delivery is a job that requires root priveledge to be able to switch to any user in order to write to his mailbox. Modular \MTA{}s do not need \name{setuid root}, but the local delivery process (or its parent) needs to run as root.
149 As mail delivery to local users, is \emph{not} included in the basic job of an \MTA{}, why should it care about it? In order to keep the system simple and to have programs that do one job well, the local delivery job should be handed over to a specialist: the \name{mail delivery agent}. \NAME{MDA}s know about the various mailbox formats and are aware of the problems of concurrent write access and thelike. Hence handling the message and the responsiblity over to a \NAME{MDA}, like \name{procmail} or \name{maildrop}, seems to be the right way to go.
151 This means an outgoing connection that pipes mail into local commands is required. Other outgoing channels, one for each supportet protocol, may be designed like it was done in other \MTA{}s.
155 \subsubsection*{Mail queue}
157 Mail queues are probably used in all \mta{}s, excluding the simple forwarders. A mail queue is a essential requirement for \masqmail, as it is to be used for non-permanent online connections. This means, mail must be queued until a online connection is available to send the message.
159 The mail queue and the module to manage it are the central part of the whole system. This demands especially for robustness and reliability, as a failure here can lead to loosing mail. An \MTA\ takes over responsibility for mail in accepting it, hence loosing mail messages is absolutely to avoid. This covers any kind of crash situation too. The worst thing acceptable to happen is a mail to be sent twice.
161 \sendmail, \exim, \qmail, \name{sendmail X}, and \masqmail\ feature one single mail queue. \postfix\ has three of them: \name{incoming}, \name{active}, and \name{deferred}. (The \name{maildrop} queue is excluded, as it is only used for the \texttt{sendmail} command.)
163 \MTA\ setups that include content scanning tend to require two separate queues. To use \sendmail\ in such setups requires two independent instances, with two separate queues, running. \exim\ can handle it with special \name{router} and \name{transport} rules, but the data flow gets complicated. Hence an idea is to use two queues, \name{incoming} and \name{active} in \postfix's terminology, with the content scanning within the move from \name{incoming} to \name{active}.
167 \subsubsection*{Sanitize mail}
169 Mail coming into the system often lacks important header lines. At least the required ones must be added from the \MTA. A good example is the \texttt{Message-Id:} header.
171 In \postfix, this is done by the \name{cleanup} module, which invokes \name{rewrite}. The position in the message flow is after coming from one of the several incoming channels and before the message is stored into the \name{incoming} queue. Modules that handle incoming channels may also add headers, for example the \texttt{From:} and \texttt{Date:} headers. \name{cleanup}, however, does a complete check to make the mail header complete and valid.
173 Apart from deciding where to sanitize the mail header, is the question where to generate the envelope. The envelope specifies the actual recipient of the mail, no matter what the \texttt{To:}, \texttt{Cc:}, and \texttt{Bcc:} headers tell. Multiple reciptients lead to multiple different envelopes, containing all the same mail message.
177 \subsubsection*{Choose route to use}
179 One key feature of \masqmail\ is its ability to send mail out in different ways. The decision is based on the current online state and whether a route may be used for a message or not. The online state can be retrieved in tree ways, explained in \ref{sec:fixme}. A route to send is found by checking every available route for being able to transfer the current message, until one matches.
181 This functionality should be implemented in the module that is responsible to invoke one of the outgoing channel modules (for example the one for \SMTP\ or the pipe module).
183 \masqmail\ can rewrite the envelope's from address and the \texttt{From:} header, dependent on the outgoing route to use. This rewrite must be done \emph{after} it is clear which route a mail will take, of course, so this may be not the module where other header editing is done.
187 \subsubsection*{Aliasing}
189 Where should aliases get expanded? They appear in different kind. Important are the ones available in the \path{aliases} file. Aliases can be:
190 \begin{itemize}
191 \item a different local user (e.g.\ ``\texttt{bob: alice}'')
192 \item a remote user (e.g.\ ``\texttt{bob: john@example.com}'')
193 \item a list of users (e.g.\ ``\texttt{bob: alice, john@example.com}'')
194 \item a command (e.g.\ ``\texttt{bob: |foo}'')
195 \end{itemize}
196 Addresses expanding to lists of users lead to more envelopes. Aliases changing the reciptients domain part may require a different route to use.
198 Aliasing is often handled in expanding the alias and reinjecting the mail into the system. Unfortunately, the mail is processed twice then; additionally does the system have to handle more mail this way. If it is wanted to check the new recipient address for acceptance and do all processing again, then reinjecting it is the best choice.
202 \subsubsection*{Authentication}
204 One thing to avoid is being an \name{open relay}. Open relays allow to relay mail from everywhere to everywhere. This is a major source of spam. The solution is restricting relay\footnote{Relaying is passing mail, that is not from and not for the own system, through it.} access.
206 Several ways to restrict access are available. The most simple one is restrictiction by the \NAME{IP} address. No extra complexity is added this way, but static \NAME{IP} addresses are mandatory. This kind of restriction may be enabled using the operating system's \path{hosts.allow} and \path{hosts.deny} files. To allow only connections to port 25 from localhost or the local network \texttt{192.168.100.0/24} insert the line ``\texttt{25: ALL}'' into \path{hosts.deny} and ``\texttt{25: 127.0.0.1, 192.168.100.}'' into \path{hosts.allow}.
208 If static access restriction is not possible, for example if mail from locations with changing \NAME{IP} addresses wants to be accepted, some kind of authentication mechanism is required. Three common kinds exist:
209 \begin{enumerate}
210 \item \SMTP-after-\NAME{POP}: uses authenication on the \NAME{POP} protocol to permit incoming \SMTP\ connections for a limited time afterwards.
211 \item \SMTP authentication: is an extension to \SMTP. Authentication can be requested before mail is accepted.
212 \item Certificates: confirm the identity of someone.
213 \end{enumerate}
214 The first mechanism requires a \NAME{POP} (or \NAME{IMAP}) server running on the same host (or a trusted one), to enable the \SMTP\ server to use the login dates on the \NAME{POP} server. This is a common practice used by mail service providers, but is not adequate for the environments \masqmail\ is designed for.
216 Certificate based authentication, like provided by \NAME{TLS}, suffers from the overhead of certificate management. But \NAME{TLS} provides encryption too, so is useful anyway.
218 \SMTP\ authentication (also refered to as \NAME{SMTP-AUTH}) suppoert is easiest received by using a \name{Simple Authentication and Security Layer} implementation. \person{Dent} sees in \NAME{SASL} the best solution for authenticating dynamic users:
219 \begin{quote}
220 %None of these add-ons is an ideal solution. They require additional code compiled into your existing daemons that may then require special write accesss to system files. They also require additional work for busy system administrators. If you cannot use any of the nonauthenticating alternatives mentioned earlier, or your business requirements demand that all of your users' mail pass through your system no matter where they are on the Internet, SASL is probably the solution that offers the most reliable and scalable method to authenticate users.
221 None of these [authentication methods] is an ideal solution. They require additional code compiled into your existing daemons that may then require special write accesss to system files. They also require additional work for busy system administrators. If you cannot use any of the nonauthenticating alternatives mentioned earlier, or your business requirements demand that all of your users' mail pass through your system no matter where they are on the Internet, \NAME{SASL} is probably the solution that offers the most reliable and scalable method to authenticate users.
222 \cite[page 44]{dent04}
223 \end{quote}
225 %either by
226 %- network/ip address
227 % easiest: restricting by static IP addresses (Access control via hosts.allow/hosts.deny)
228 %or
229 %- some kind of auth (for dynamic remote hosts)
230 % adds complexity
231 % - SASL
232 % - POP/IMAP: pop-before-smtp, DRAC, WHOSON
233 % - TLS (certificates)
237 \subsubsection*{Encryption}
239 Electronic mail is very weak to sniffing attacks, because all data transfer is unencrypted. This concerns the message's content, as well as the email addresses in header and envelope, but also authentication dialogs that may transfer plain text passwords (\NAME{PLAIN} and \NAME{LOGIN} are examples). Adding encryption is therefor wanted.
241 The common way to encrypt \SMTP\ dialogs is using \name{Transport Layer Security} (short: \TLS, successor of \NAME{SSL}). \TLS\ encrypts the datagrams of the \name{transport layer}. This means it works below the application protocols and can be used by any of them\citeweb{wikipedia:tls}.
243 \TLS\ allows to create secure tunnels through which arbitrary programs can communicate. Hence one can add secure communication afterwards to programs without changing them. \name{OpenSSL} for example---a free implementation---allows traffic to be piped into a command; a secure tunnel is created and the traffic is forwarded through it. Or a secure tunnel can be set up between a local and a remote port; this tunnel can then be used by any application.
245 The \NAME{POP} protocol, for example, is good suited for such tunneling, but \SMTP\ is is not generally. Outgoing \SMTP\ client connections can be tunneled without problem---\masqmail\ already provides a configure option called \texttt{wrapper} to do so. Tunneling incomming connections to a server leads to problems with \SMTP. As data comes encrypted through the tunnel to the receiving host and gets then decrypted and forwarded on local to the port the application listens on. From the \MTA's view, this makes all connections appear to come from localhost, unfortunately. Figure \ref{fig:stunnel} depicts the data flow.
247 \begin{figure}
248 \begin{center}
249 \input{input/stunnel.tex}
250 \end{center}
251 \caption{Data flow using \name{stunnel}}
252 \label{fig:stunnel}
253 \end{figure}
255 For incoming connections, \NAME{STARTTLS}---defined in \RFC2487---is what \mta{}s implement.
257 \masqmail\ is already able to encrypt outgoing connections, but encryption of incoming connections, using \NAME{STARTTLS} should be implemented. This only affects the \SMTP\ server module.
259 %TLS/SSL prevents attackers to listen on the cable
260 %but it does not prevent man-in-the-middle attacks
261 %signed certificates help here
262 % or PGP encryption
265 %do not use stunnel wit SMTP:
266 %because all incoming mail would be from 127.0.0.1 !!
267 %use STARTTLS instead
269 %postfix: main.cf
270 %\begin{verbatim}
271 % smtpd_use_tls = yes
272 % smtpd_tls_received_header = no (does not log in received headers)
273 %
274 % smtpd_tls_key_file = /etc/postfix/key.pem
275 % smtpd_tls_cert_file = /etc/postfix/cert.pem
276 % smtpd_tls_CA_file = /etc/postfix/CAcert.pem
277 %
278 % smtp_use_tls = yes (use TLS for sending)
279 % smtp_tls_key_file = /etc/postfix/key.pem
280 % smtp_tls_cert_file = /etc/postfix/cert.pem
281 % smtp_tls_CA_file = /etc/postfix/CAcert.pem
282 %\end{verbatim}
287 \subsubsection*{Spam prevention}
290 where to filter what
293 postfix:
294 content-filter: arbitrary programs that talk smtp, can filter, rewrite or delete mail
295 - before-queue-c-f: need to be fast, can prevent system load
296 - after-queue-c-f: need more resources in global, more load
298 exim:
299 acls: to filter, what to accept (hook into smtp dialog) (complex)
300 routers: take recipient address and choose a matching transport
301 transports: ways to deliver mail (smtp, local)
304 postfix: after-queue-content-filter (smtp communication)
305 exim: content-scan-feature (analyses the content: MIME stuff, blacklisted words, virus scanning) (all within smtp dialog)
306 sendmail: milter (tcp or unix sockets)
308 checks while smtp dialog (pre-queue): in MTA implemented (need to be fast)
309 checks when mail is accepted and queued: external (amavis, spamassassin)
316 what do do with recognized mail?
317 - reject (only possible if recognized during SMTP dialog)
318 - forward with added header line or changed subject
319 (eisentraut05: page 18--20)
321 check incoming and outgoing mail
322 (eisentraut05: page 21)
325 milter:
326 communication with external daemons via a special protocol
327 at various times in the smtp dialog possible
328 can reject, delete or alter messages
329 http://milter.org
330 (eisentraut05: page 69)
333 use SA with exim:
334 - with transport: piped into sa
335 - content-scanning-feature: with ACL during smtp dialog
336 - plugin: sa-exim
337 - within amavis
339 use SA with sendmail:
340 - with milter
341 - within mimedefang or amavis
343 use SA with postfix:
344 - within amavis or mailfilter
347 (eisentraut05: page 25) ``Ganz ohne Analyse während der SMTP-Phase kommt sowieso kein MTA aus, und es ist eine Frage der Einschätzung, wie weit man diese Phase belasten möchte.''
350 DNSBL can contain:
351 - open relays
352 - dynamic IP addresses
353 - verified spam sources
354 - open multistage relays
355 - vulnerable CGI scripts
356 - open proxy servers
357 example: NJABL (http://njabl.org)
359 DNSBL in smpt dialog is aggressive and can lead to problems (eisentraut05: page 126)
362 greylisting:
363 if first contact from that address: temp failure and add to list
364 sender will retry, then accept
366 ``Das Greylisting zählt derzeit zu den effektivsten Methoden, um gegen unerwünschte E-Mails vorzugehen. Allein durch Greylisting können derzeit rund 70\% des potenziellen Spam-Aufkommens auf einem Mailserver vollständig geblockt werden. Allerdings ist es auch nur eine Frage der Zeit, bis sich die Gemeinde der Spammer und Virenautoren auf diese Methode der Spam-Bekämpfung eingerichtet und entsprechende Queues in ihre Software eingebaut hat.''(eisentraut05: page 138)
367 Probleme: load balancing using multiple servers with different IPs.
368 postfix: with policy server
369 exim: direct in config
370 sendmail: with greylist milter
374 hashcash
377 \subsubsection*{Virus checking}
379 The same for malicious content (\name{malware}) like viruses, worms, trojan horses. They are related to spam, but affect the \MTA less, as they are in the mail body.
381 message body <-> envelope, header
384 anti-virus: clamav
385 postfix: via amavis
386 exim: via content-scanning-feature called from acl
387 sendmail: with milter
388 procmail
391 virus scanner work on file level
392 amavis receives mail via smtp or pipe, splits it in its parts (MIME) and extracks archives, the come the virus scanners
393 if the mail is okay, it goes via smtp to a second mta
396 AMaViS (amavisd-new): email filter framework to integrate spam and virus scanner
397 \begin{verbatim}
398 internet -->25 MTA -->10024 amavis -->10025 MTA --> reciptient
399 | |
400 +----------------------------+
401 \end{verbatim}
403 postfix and exim can habe both mta servises in the same instance, sendmail needs two instances running.
405 what amavis recognizes:
406 - invalid headers
407 - banned files
408 - viruses
409 - spam (using spam assassin)
412 mimedefang: uses milter interface with sendmail
415 MailScanner:
416 incoming queue --> MailScanner --> outgoing queue
418 postfix: with one instance possible, exim and sendmail need two instances running
423 \subsubsection*{Archiving}
426 \texttt{always\_bcc} feature of postfix
430 \section{A new architecture}
433 (ssl)
434 -> msg-in (local or remote protocol handlers)
435 -> spam-filter (and more)
436 -> queue
437 -> msg-out (local-delivery by MDA, or remote-protocol-handlers)
438 (ssl)
444 http://fanf.livejournal.com/50917.html %how not to design an mta - the sendmail command
445 http://fanf.livejournal.com/51349.html %how not to design an mta - partitioning for security
446 http://fanf.livejournal.com/61132.html %how not to design an mta - local delivery
447 http://fanf.livejournal.com/64941.html %how not to design an mta - spool file format
448 http://fanf.livejournal.com/65203.html %how not to design an mta - spool file logistics
449 http://fanf.livejournal.com/65911.html %how not to design an mta - more about log-structured MTA queues
450 http://fanf.livejournal.com/67297.html %how not to design an mta - more log-structured MTA queues
451 http://fanf.livejournal.com/70432.html %how not to design an mta - address verification
452 http://fanf.livejournal.com/72258.html %how not to design an mta - content scanning
473 \section{Directions to go}
475 This section discusses about what shapes \masqmail\ could have---which directions the development could go to.
481 \subsubsection*{\masqmail\ in five years}
483 Now how could \masqmail\ be like in, say, five years?
485 ---
487 A design from scratch?
488 << what would be needed (effort) >>
489 But how is the effort of this complete rewrite compared to what is gained afterwards?
491 << would one create it at all? >>
493 ---
495 << plans to get masqmail more popular again (if that is the goal) >>
497 << More users >>
505 \section{Work to do}
507 << short term goals --- long term goals >>
509 do it like sendmail: first do the most needed stuff on the old design to make it still usable. Then design a new version from scratch, for the future.
511 << which parts to take out and do within the thesis >>